Rationality

So in the latest batch of intro philosophy papers, one of the common topics that students addressed was whether or not the U.S. should implement compulsory voting. They were supposed to assess the arguments presented in an article by Peter Singer (in which he advocates the idea – read it here) and then take a stance for or against it.

To my surprise, the unanimous response by the students was an emphatic and bitter rejection. Every one of them argued that a government which forces its citizens to vote is undemocratic. Clearly the general feeling was that compulsory voting would somehow violate one’s inalienable right NOT to vote. At this point, the students’ arguments tended to fizzle out without addressing the pertinent question that follows from this idea: why should we have a right not to vote?

Typically when we think of rights, we think of them as the freedom to perform some action – to violate a right is usually to prohibit an action. The right to bear arms is violated if the government prevents us from owning guns, but is it violated if the government forces us to own guns? Our right to free speech is violated if the government silences us, but is it violated if they force us to speak out? These questions seem odd, and I think the reason is that whenever the government steps in to require some action, it is because there is some overriding obligation that takes precedence. We have a right to do what we please with our income, yet we must pay taxes. We have a right to do what we please with our own bodies, yet men of a certain age are forced to register with the selective service (and potentially be conscripted for war). We have a right to drive vehicles, yet we must register them and get them inspected. Each of these examples are requirements under penalty of law.

Granted, my examples are not quite on par with the right to vote, but I think it illustrates the point – the government can and does dictate our actions under certain circumstances. In the cases above, the overriding obligations are that of distributive justice, protecting the state, and protecting the environment. In the case of voting, is it not reasonable to claim that there is an overriding obligation (a civic duty) for citizens to participate in elections, to support an election with just and accurate representation? As far as I’m concerned, compulsory voting would not be at odds with the spirit of democracy. Quite the contrary; it is the apathetic or willful decision NOT to vote that seems to go against democratic ideals.

There seemed to be a further concern among the students that compulsory voting somehow shifts more power into the hands of the government. I simply do not know what that is supposed to mean. If anything it puts the power into the hands of the people, whether they want it or not. But even for those who would rather not vote, what harm is being done? The worst case scenario (in Singer’s example) would be a small fine. If anyone is disgruntled enough with the U.S. government such that they do not vote on principle, then they probably just don’t understand how the government works (or they do, and they should probably move). It seems to me that people who want change should want to vote! In any case, if compulsory voting were implemented, it would surely be done through regular legislative procedures with the general approval of the population.

The last point I have in favor of compulsory voting is that I think it would probably spur more interest and debate about political issues. People who don’t know about the candidates and the relevant issues would probably learn more – they might have the motivation to learn more, since they would have the responsibility of choosing a candidate. Perhaps I’m overly optimistic, but I would hope that if people are forced to get involved (and, say, 95% of the population votes), they might feel like they are a part of something bigger and more important than just one individual casting a ballot. Ideally, compulsory voting would engender a sense of community solidarity, patriotism, and appreciation for the rights and freedoms we blithely take for granted.

I’m curious about what other people think. I know my reader base is quite small, but this is a topic that is accessible to anyone – so respond, anonymously if you must, and say whether and why you are for or against compulsory voting. I wonder if I’m in the minority on this one.

Economic concepts like ‘poverty’ and ’social equality’ have historically been defined in terms of a person’s income – all those with less than income $x are below the poverty line, or since person A makes more money than person B, A is in a position to have a better quality of life than B. Such conceptions are overly simplistic and there have been some promising attempts at developing a fuller theory of these ideas.

John Rawls advocates the use of ‘primary goods’ rather than just income as a measurement for economic terms. Primary goods include income, but also things like “rights and liberties, powers and opportunities… and the ‘bases of self-respect’.” The idea is that people equally value primary goods and can generally achieve equal levels of well-being, given the same amount of goods. Rawls is definitely taking a step forward, but he still misses the mark in some respects.

Amartya Sen developed the ‘capabilities approach’, which I believe does an extremely good job of filling in the gaps in our understanding of welfare economics and the normative concepts in question. Not that he needs my approval – Sen won the Nobel Prize in ‘97, and the capabilities approach is quite possibly the rising new paradigm of economic theory. He writes:

…the appropriate “space” [for evaluating one's well-being, i.e., determining poverty levels, etc.] is neither that of utilities (as claimed by welfarists), nor that of primary goods (as demanded by Rawls), but that of the substantive freedoms – the capabilities – to choose a life one has reason to value. If the object is to concentrate on the individual’s real opportunity to pursue her objectives (as Rawls explicitly recommends), then account would have to be taken not only of the primary goods the persons respectively hold, but also of the relevant personal characteristics that govern the conversion of primary goods into the person’s ability to promote her ends.

- Development as Freedom p. 91

The main problem Sen has with Rawls is that there are inevitable inequalities in people’s abilities to live the kinds of lives they want to live, given equal primary goods. What one person can do with some amount of money, what they can make of their rights and liberties, and what opportunities they can realistically pursue varies greatly depending on their individual circumstances.  *My original example was rather weak – here’s a better one*  Suppose Pete, Mary, and James have the same income, rights and liberties, opportunities, etc.  James is the ideal citizen in every way and he leads a good life.  Pete suffers from a debilitating illness and a large portion of his income goes to medical costs – though his income is identical to James’s, Pete clearly cannot convert his income to the same quality of life as that of James.  Mary is healthy, but her family religion teaches that women should be subservient to men.  Consequently, Mary is unable to convert her income into the same quality of life as James (or Pete) because she is oppressed by her family’s religious values.  Give these simple examples, it is evident that equality in terms of primary goods does not guarantee an equal capability to convert those goods into the kind of life one wants to live.

Economists have long recognized these kinds of inequalities (notably, Adam Smith), but have assumed that they are too hard to measure and too vague to include in a theory of welfare. Sen has turned the traditional view on it’s head. He argues not only that supposed ‘intangibles’ like these must be accounted for, but also that they can be measured – that they can be included in a comprehensive, mathematical, and pragmatic theory of welfare economics. The Sen/Rawls debate is the topic of my political philosophy paper. To be sure, I side with Sen, and the more I read about his ideas I am just blown away that he doesn’t get more attention. Ok, so he got that Nobel Prize, but that’s not enough – Sen’s work should be taught beginning in high school government/economics classes and retaught at the college level. Sadly, he’s barely even being mentioned in my political philosophy class.