Rationality

The Is-Ought/Naturalistic fallacy has come up a number of times in my intro classes this semester.  First, it’s worth pointing out that I have had trouble finding clear definitions of these things – even the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy goes so far as to mention that the definitions are not agreed upon amongst professional philosophers.  The problem I have in mind, though, is basically this: It is a mistake to think that something is morally permissible just because it is natural and it is a mistake to think that something is morally wrong because it is unnatural.

So stated it seems clear to me that those are mistakes and should be avoided.  One reason is that ‘natural’ is not a well-defined term or, at least, it is certainly not used consistently by the ‘folk’.  The go to example would be homosexuality – some conservatives think it’s unnatural and might thereby conclude that it is immoral; some liberals think it’s natural and might thereby conclude that it is moral.  The uses of ‘natural’ are different in each case.  The former might be not much more than a synonym for disgust (i.e., it’s gross, so it’s unnatural), while the latter might be an appeal to the observations of homosexuality in non-human animals.  I don’t think either interpretation of ‘natural’ warrants the conclusions drawn.

The second reason against such arguments is the fact that counter-examples abound.  I might find the sight of a needle puncturing one’s skin (e.g., to administer a flu vaccine) to be gross and unnatural, but I wouldn’t thereby consider it immoral.  I might notice that in their natural habitats chimpanzees throw their feces at one another, but I wouldn’t thereby consider such acts morally permissible in human beings.  Thankfully these kinds of examples suffice to curtail the use of similar arguments among my students (e.g., we naturally eat meat, so it is morally permissible).

However, there is a deeper problem that is not so easily resolved.  The “is-ought fallacy” is not quite the same as the “natural, ergo moral” arguments above.  In short, the claim is that it is a mistake to derive an ‘ought’ statement from an ‘is’ statement, that ethical conclusions cannot be drawn from factual statements.  It is not as clear to me that this is really a fallacy – perhaps a topic for my next post.

I recently stumbled across a version of the problem of evil (given by Peter Singer – though he is not the first to point it out, it is an especially important matter for him) that strikes me as especially problematic for the Judeo-Christian concept of God.  In case you don’t know the basic version, it may be presented as follows:

1. God is omnipotent.
2. God is omni-benevolent.
3. God is omniscient.
4. Evil exists.

The problem is that while each of these propositions are individually acceptable, they appear to be inconsistent – that is, it appears that they cannot all be true at the same time.  Virtually no one will deny (4), that evil exists in the world.  However, if (1)-(3) are also true, then God knows about the evil, he has the power to do away with it, and being all-good he should want to do away with it – yet evil still exists.

Of course, as I said, it may be argued that these propositions merely appear to be inconsistent and that, in fact, they are not.  Some of the typical (and most effective) Christian responses are that evil is the result of (i) free-will, (ii) original sin, or (iii) the fact that evil is necessary in order for us to learn life-lessons but for which evil we are eventually repaid in the afterlife.  I find these answers to be prima facie plausible and consistent with Christian teachings.

The problem of animal suffering, however, cannot be resolved by any of the typical responses.  We can take the same set of propositions as before, but replace (4) with (4a): Animals suffer needlessly.  Once again, God knows about their suffering, he could stop it, and he should want to stop it – yet they still suffer.  Virtually no one will deny (4a); it seems clear that animals feel pain.  Animals have nervous systems conducive to their feeling pain and they clearly behave as if they feel pain.  Anyone who has had a dog , cat, or other animal as a friend surely believes animals can suffer and that we, as moral beings, have some kind of obligation to prevent their suffering.

However, the typical Christian responses to the problem of evil will no longer apply.  As for (i), Christianity clearly does not teach that animals have free-will, since free-will is a unique gift afforded to human beings.  Regarding (ii), it is equally clear that animals do not suffer due to original sin, since they have no relation to Adam and Eve (and it’s called the fall of man after all, not the fall of animals [although I suppose by this reasoning women would not suffer due to original sin either, so let's call it the fall of humankind {and don't you hate it when I start using nested parentheses!  I blame this on my spending too many hours playing with logic proofs}]).  Last, it cannot be the case that, as in (iii), animals suffer in order to teach human beings life-lessons; this is evinced by the fact that animals have endured much suffering over the many millions of years that they existed on an Earth devoid of human life.  But even today, animals face all kinds of suffering that has nothing to do with human activities (regular things like drought, famine, or being eaten by a tiger); and to top it all off, the animals would get no recompense in an afterlife (since, sadly, all dogs don’t go to heaven).  Without appealing to ‘mysterious ways’, the ‘best possible world’ argument, or pleading ignorance in some other fashion, I’m at a loss as to what a reasonable response would be.

So in the latest batch of intro philosophy papers, one of the common topics that students addressed was whether or not the U.S. should implement compulsory voting. They were supposed to assess the arguments presented in an article by Peter Singer (in which he advocates the idea – read it here) and then take a stance for or against it.

To my surprise, the unanimous response by the students was an emphatic and bitter rejection. Every one of them argued that a government which forces its citizens to vote is undemocratic. Clearly the general feeling was that compulsory voting would somehow violate one’s inalienable right NOT to vote. At this point, the students’ arguments tended to fizzle out without addressing the pertinent question that follows from this idea: why should we have a right not to vote?

Typically when we think of rights, we think of them as the freedom to perform some action – to violate a right is usually to prohibit an action. The right to bear arms is violated if the government prevents us from owning guns, but is it violated if the government forces us to own guns? Our right to free speech is violated if the government silences us, but is it violated if they force us to speak out? These questions seem odd, and I think the reason is that whenever the government steps in to require some action, it is because there is some overriding obligation that takes precedence. We have a right to do what we please with our income, yet we must pay taxes. We have a right to do what we please with our own bodies, yet men of a certain age are forced to register with the selective service (and potentially be conscripted for war). We have a right to drive vehicles, yet we must register them and get them inspected. Each of these examples are requirements under penalty of law.

Granted, my examples are not quite on par with the right to vote, but I think it illustrates the point – the government can and does dictate our actions under certain circumstances. In the cases above, the overriding obligations are that of distributive justice, protecting the state, and protecting the environment. In the case of voting, is it not reasonable to claim that there is an overriding obligation (a civic duty) for citizens to participate in elections, to support an election with just and accurate representation? As far as I’m concerned, compulsory voting would not be at odds with the spirit of democracy. Quite the contrary; it is the apathetic or willful decision NOT to vote that seems to go against democratic ideals.

There seemed to be a further concern among the students that compulsory voting somehow shifts more power into the hands of the government. I simply do not know what that is supposed to mean. If anything it puts the power into the hands of the people, whether they want it or not. But even for those who would rather not vote, what harm is being done? The worst case scenario (in Singer’s example) would be a small fine. If anyone is disgruntled enough with the U.S. government such that they do not vote on principle, then they probably just don’t understand how the government works (or they do, and they should probably move). It seems to me that people who want change should want to vote! In any case, if compulsory voting were implemented, it would surely be done through regular legislative procedures with the general approval of the population.

The last point I have in favor of compulsory voting is that I think it would probably spur more interest and debate about political issues. People who don’t know about the candidates and the relevant issues would probably learn more – they might have the motivation to learn more, since they would have the responsibility of choosing a candidate. Perhaps I’m overly optimistic, but I would hope that if people are forced to get involved (and, say, 95% of the population votes), they might feel like they are a part of something bigger and more important than just one individual casting a ballot. Ideally, compulsory voting would engender a sense of community solidarity, patriotism, and appreciation for the rights and freedoms we blithely take for granted.

I’m curious about what other people think. I know my reader base is quite small, but this is a topic that is accessible to anyone – so respond, anonymously if you must, and say whether and why you are for or against compulsory voting. I wonder if I’m in the minority on this one.